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Recent Decision
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-CODE

OF

JUDICIAL

CONDUCT-REMOVAL

FROM JUDICIAL OFFICE-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held

that judicial resignation does not foreclose the supreme court from
rendering a decision which forever bars a judge found guilty of judicial misconduct from holding judicial office in the future.
In the Matter of Glancey, 542 A.2d 1350 (1988).
This proceeding arose out of the alleged violations committed by
Judge R. Glancey of the Philadelphia Municipal Court (Glancey
herein) in his association with the Roofers' Union Local 30-30B.1
The issue presented was whether Glancey's resignation of his judicial commission and his assention to an order permanently barring
him from judicial service rendered moot further consideration of
the allegations of misconduct during his term as a judicial officer.
Glancey's conduct in this matter brought him before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania once before in the case of In the
Matter of Glancey.s In that case, Glancey was investigated by the
1. In the Matter of Glancey, 542 A.2d 1350, 1351 (1988) [hereinafter Glancy II]. In the
recent case of In the Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473 (1988), the supreme
court ordered removal or suspension of eight of Glancey's colleagues for the same violations
that Glancey was alleged to have committed. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1351.
2. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1353.
3. In the Matter of Glancey, 515 Pa. 201, 527 A.2d 997 (1987) [hereinafter Glancey I].
This case presented the issue of whether the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination may be validly asserted by a judge in Pennsylvania to avoid making financial disclosures mandated by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Order No. 47, promulgated April 13, 1984.
See infra note 16 for the language of Order No. 47. Both Judges Glancey and Chiovero
failed to answer Question 11 on their Statement of Financial Interest, which requires a judicial officer to list all gifts received in cash or property having a value of $200.00 or more. Id.
at 998. The Board charged the judges with violating Pennsylvania Constitution, art. V, §
17(b), Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3302
(Purdon 1979). Id. at 204-05, 527 A.2d at 998. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that: 1) the judges right against self-incrimination was not violated by the supreme court
order requiring them to answer Question 11 in the financial interest statement or be charged
with misconduct sufficient to warrant removal; 2) the judges were not denied the right to
due process to the allegation that the Board commingled the functions of prosecutor and
adjudicator; and 3) the judges would not be removed for noncompliance, but would be given
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Judicial Inquiry and Review Board ("Board")" for his failure to
respond adequately to a question regarding gifts received during
the year having a value of $200.00 or more on his Statement of
Financial Interest for 1985.1 Following a hearing, the Board concluded that Glancey knowingly and willfully failed to answer the
question in violation of Article V, section 17(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution,6 Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,7 and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. section 3302(Purdon 1979),'
30 days to provide the required information, where there was no specific, categorical warning that a claim of the fifth amendment privilege would amount to misconduct warranting
removal. Id. at 1004-05.
4. Glancy H, 542 A.2d at 1351. The Pennsylvania Constitution establishes a Judicial
Inquiry and Review Board and requires that it consist of nine members as follows:
[T]hree judges of the court of common pleas from different judicial districts and two
judges of the Superior Court, all of whom shall be selected by the supreme court; and
two non-judge members of the bar of the supreme court and two non-lawyer electors,
all of whom shall be selected by the Governor.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a). The members serve for four year terms and the Board may act
only with the concurrence of a majority of its members. Id. at § 18(b). A member of the
Board is restricted from holding office in a political party or political organization. Id. at §
18(c). The purpose of the Board is to receive complaints, conduct investigations and hearings, and make recommendations to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as to matters relating
to grounds for suspension, removal, discipline, or compulsory retirement of justices or
judges. Id. at §§ 18(d)-(h). See also 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2101 and § 2105 (Purdon
1979).
5. Glancey H, 542 A.2d at 1351. Glancey had filed this statement with the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts ("AOPC"), wherein he responded to Question 11, regarding gifts received during the year having a value of $200.00 or more, with the statement:
"Response respectfully declined at this time on grounds of constitutional privilege." AOPC
referred the matter to the Board for investigation. Id.
6. Id. at 1351. Under Article V, § 17(b), "[j]ustices and judges shall not engage in any
activity prohibited by law and shall not violate any canon of legal or judicial ethics prescribed by the Supreme Court." PA. CONST. art. V, § 17(b). Other pertinent parts of § 17 are
as follows:
(a) Justices and judges shall devote full time to heir judicial duties, and shall not
engage in the practice of law, hold office in a political party or political organization,
or hold an office or position of profit in the government of the United States, the
Commonwealth or any municipal corporation or political subdivision thereof, except
in the armed service of the United States or the Commonwealth.
(c) No justice, judge or justice of the peace shall be paid or accept for the performance of any judicial duty or for any service connected with his office, any fee, emolument or perquisite other than the salary and expenses provided by law.
PA. CONST. art V, § 17(a), (c).
7. Glancey H, 542 A.2d at 1351. Those Canons provide:
Canon 1. A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity andIndependence of the Judiciary.
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A
judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and
applied to further that objective.
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and recommended removal of Judge Glancey from his judicial
office."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the Board's
findings as to misconduct, but declined to order removal because of
a perceived lack of prior warning to Glancey that his conduct was
prohibited.' 0 Accordingly, Glancey was allowed thirty days to provide the required information, which he complied with, and the
charges were dismissed."
During this Board proceeding, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") was conducting an investigation into racketeering activities involving the Roofers' Union Local 30-30B ("Union"),
which subsequently led to a sixty-one count indictment against the
Union for making cash payments to public officers, including several judges. 1 2 Pursuant to the public disclosure of this activity, the
Board initiated an inquiry into the matter.' 3 By a letter dated December 12, 1986, Glancey was formally charged by the Board with
violations of Canons 1, 2 and 5C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 4 Article V, section 17(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1 (1973).

Canon 2 states in pertinent part:
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His
Activities
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence his
judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to advance
the private interests of others; nor should he convey or knowingly permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him. He should
not testify voluntarily as a character witness.
Id. at Canon 2.
8. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1351. Section 3302 provides in pertinent part: "Judges
shall not engage in any activity prohibited by this subchapter or any other provision of law
and shall not violate any canon of ethics prescribed by general rule." 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3302 (1979).
9. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1351.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1351. On July 2, 1987, Glancey filed a letter with the AOPC amending his
response to Question 11. He stated that the gift was from Thomas Brown of the Union in
the amount of $300.00 cash which was given to him as a Christmas Gift. Id.
12. Id. On October 23, 1986, a federal grand jury sitting in Philadelphia returned the
indictment charging nineteen individuals with using kickback money from the Union's Prepaid Legal Services Plan to make cash payments to public officials. Id.
13. Id. The Board reviewed the information developed in the federal investigation,
including evidence of an electronic surveillance of the Union hall and testimony elicited
before the federal grand jury. Id.
14. See supra note 7 for the language of Canons 1 and 2. Canon 5C(1) states that:
A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect ad-
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and Pennsylvania Supreme Court Order No. 47."e The charges alleged an acceptance of cash from a representative of the Union in
1983, 1984, and 1985, as well as a failure to report said payments
for the years 1984 and 1985.17 The Board amended these allegations to further charge that Glancey provided false information to
FBI agents investigating the payments and later invoked his privi18
lege against self-incrimination in the grand jury investigation.
Glancey either denied or pleaded his fifth amendment privilege to
all four charges.1 9
On January 30, 1987, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
granted the prayer of the Board's petition and ordered suspension
of Glancey, with pay, during the pendency of the proceedings
before the Board.1 0 After a hearing was held on April 13, 1987, the
versely on his impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial position, or involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers
or persons likely to come before the court on which he serves.
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5C(1) (1973).
15. See supra note 6.
16. Glancey 11, 542 A.2d at 1352. Pennsylvania Supreme Court Order No. 47, promulgated April 13, 1984, mandates "[tihat all judicial officers ... shall file a statement of financial interest in accordance with the provisions set forth herein and on the form attached
hereto or such amended form as may be issued hereafter." 503 Pa. XXXIV, 472 A.2d LIV.
All statements are filed with the AOPC and are made available for public inspection and
copying. Part 5 of this Order states:
5. Failure to File; Falsification of Reports:
(A) Upon failure of any judicial officer to file the required statement within the time
allowed, the Administrative Office shall give notice to such judicial officer that failure
to comply with this Order within ten (10) days shall result in suspension of the judicial officer from his duties.
(B) Following the receipt of this notice, if the judicial officer fails to file the statement
within the ten-day period, the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts shall immediately notify the Supreme Court of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board of the
delinquency in filing.
(C) The knowing and willful falsification of any information required to be reported
pursuant to this Order, or the knowing and willful failure to report information as
required by this Order, shall constitute a charge of misconduct and shall result in
referral of the case to the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board for expedited
disposition.
Id.
17. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1352. "No disclosure was required for the year 1983 since
Order No. 47 did not become effective until 1984." Id. at 1352 n.3.
18. Id. at 1352. The Board amended the allegations by letter dated January 28, 1987.
Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Under Rule 24 of the Rules of Procedure Governing the Judicial Inquiry and
Review Board, the General Counsel may petition the supreme court for injunctive or other
appropriate interim relief, including temporary suspension, upon a determination that "the
continued service of the judge is causing immediate and substantial public harm and an
erosion of public confidence to the orderly administration of justice ..
" 542 A.2d at 1352
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Board found insufficient clear and convincing evidence to support
a finding that Glancey received a gift from the Union in 1983 and
1984, and dismissed the charges related to Glancey's invocation of
his privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury.2"
With regard to the remaining charges, the Board found that Glancey had accepted $300.00 cash from the Union in 1985, and that he
deliberately misinformed federal investigators about the receipt of
cash from the Union.2 2 The majority of the Board, with three
members dissenting, recommended the removal of Glancey from
his judicial office."
The Board filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recommending removal of Glancey, who also filed a petition
seeking to set aside the report and recommendation of the Board.2 '
Prior to oral arguments in this matter, the court filed its decision
in In the Matter of Cunningham,2 5 where eight judges were removed or suspended for improper conduct involving the Union."
Thereafter, Glancey tendered his resignation to the Governor on
March 16, 1988, effective March 31, 1988.7
In an opinion by Chief Justice Nix, expressing the unanimous
view of the six participating members of the court, 8 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania concluded that Glancey's resignation from
his judicial commission and his assent to an order permanently
barring him from judicial service did not render moot further consideration of the allegations of misconduct during his term as a
n.4.
21. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1352. The Board dismissed those charges after finding that
as a matter of law Glancey's invocation of the fifth amendment could not support an imposition of discipline. Id.
22. Id. These conclusion were based on videotaped deposition testimony by Thomas
Brown, a former employee of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, and by William
Market, special assistant to Glancey, who testified before the federal grand jury. Id.
23. Id. at 1353.
24. Id.
25. 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473 (1988). See supra note 1 and infra notes 26, 40, 48, 87,
88, 90, 94-96, 98, 102, 103, 105-113 and 131.
26. Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 423, 538 A.2d at 475. The eight sitting Philadelphia
County judges were found to have received cash from the Union in return for special treatment, and were subsequently removed or suspended from the office of Judge. Id.
27. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1353. Glancey then filed a Motion for Summary Disposition of this matter acknowledging his resignation and consenting to an entry of an order
declaring him ineligible for election to judicial office in the future. The court reserved judgment on the motion until the time for oral argument. Id.
28. Id. Justice Larsen did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Id. at 1356.
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judicial officer.2 9 Relying on their recent decision in Judicial Inquiry & Review Board v. Snyder, 0 the court reasoned that, notwithstanding Glancey's consent to an order making him ineligible
for future judicial service, "[tihis Court is responsible for maintaining the integrity of judicial administration so as to uphold public respect for the rule of law. Once instituted, our jurisdiction over
the disciplinary proceedings is thus only at an end when we issue a
final order." 81 The court further stated that Article V, section 18(1)
of the Pennsylvania Constitution 2 provides that where the appropriate sanction for judicial misbehavior justifies removal, it carries
with it a permanent bar against future judicial service. 3 Thus, the
mere termination of judicial office and the gratuitous promise by a
former judge not to seek or hold judicial office in this commonwealth in the future does not satisfy the constitutional requirement of an imposition of the sanction of removal by the court.3 '
Under Article V, sections 18(g) 3 5 and 18(h) of the Pennsylvania
Constitution," the court must review the record of the Board's
proceedings on the law and the facts.3 7 Therefore, if after the
court's mandatory review of the record it is convinced "that the
'just and proper' (Article V, section 18(h)) sanction would be removal, then it is [their] duty to assure not only that the offending
jurist's current term of office is forfeited, but also that the miscreant is barred forever from holding judicial office." 38 After reviewing
29. Id. at 1353. The court stated that when other issues remain for adjudication, the
case is not moot and the court must accept its responsibility to decide the matter. Id. See,
e.g., Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 93, 375 A.2d 698 (1977).
30. 514 Pa. 142, 523 A.2d 294, cert. denied sub nom., Snyder v. Pennsylvania Judicial
Inquiry & Review Bd., 108 S. Ct. 100 (1987). In Snyder, Judge Snyder had been charged
with misconduct in connection with a trial over which he presided. Id. at 144-51, 523 A.2d at
295-98. Prior to the court's action, Snyder failed in his bid for retention, and was thus removed from office by the electorate. Id. at 151, 523 A.2d at 298. Despite Snyder's termination, the court proceeded to determine whether a permanent bar was warranted. Id. at 15153, 523 A.2d at 298-99.
31. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1353 (citing Snyder, 514 Pa. at 151, 523 A.2d at 298-99).
32. Article V, 18(1) provides: "A justice, judge, or justice of the peace convicted of
misbehavior in office by a court, disbarred as a member of the bar of the Supreme Court or
removed under this section eighteen shall forfeit automatically his judicial office and thereafter be ineligible for judicial office." PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(1).
33. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1353.
34. Id. at 1354.
35. Article V, § 18(g) provides that the court is mandated to review the record once
the matter is directed to it by the Board. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(g).
36. Article V, § 18(h) states that the court shall review the record on the law and facts.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(h).
37. Glancey I, 542 A. 2d at 1354.
38. Id. The court reasoned that a resignation would satisfy the removal from office
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the Board's proceedings in Glancy II, the supreme court held that
there was clear and convincing evidence that Glancey accepted
funds from the Union and that he provided misleading information
4
to FBI agents.3 9 Therefore, the court's decision in Cunningham 0
1
would warrant the removal of Glancey from his judicial post.4

In his arguments, Glancey alleged that gifts of this nature were
not prohibited under the existing rules and that his conduct relating to the information he gave or failed to give to the FBI agents
was not a basis for censure.'" Glancey contended that Article V,
section 17(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution 43 was not intended
to address the conduct for which the court employed it in Cunningham." He further asserted that section 17(c) was designed to
abolish the fee system for justices of the peace and was not aimed
at forbidding gifts to judges.'3 The supreme court rejected this allegation, reasoning that section 17(c) clearly states
that it applies
'4
to every "justice, judge or justice of the peace." "

Secondly, Glancey contended that his due process rights would
be violated if the court found him in violation of section 17(c), for
which he had not been charged.' 7 The court readily dismissed
this
8
argument, however, based on its decision in Cunningham.'
requirement but it would not satisfy the requirement that the offending jurist be forever
barred from holding judicial office. Therefore, the court must enter an order, based on its
findings, forever barring the jurist from judicial office. Id.
39. Id. at 1354.
40. In the Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473 (1988). See supra notes 1
and 26 and infra notes 48, 87, 88, 90, 94-96, 98, 102, 103, 105-113, 131. In Cunningham, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ordered removal of three of the judges who were found to
have accepted cash from the Union and provided misleading information to federal investigators. Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 440-45, 538 A.2d at 485-87.
41. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1354.
42. Id. In his arguments, Glancey attempted to challenge the court's view as expressed
in Cunningham, rather than distinguish it from his current factual situation. Id.
43. Article V, § 17(c) provides: "No justice, judge or justice of the peace shall be paid
or accept for the performance of any judicial duty or for any service connected with his
office, any fee, emolument or perquisite other than the salary and expenses provided by
law." PA. CONST. art. V, § 17(c).
44. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1354.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing PA. CONST. art. V, § 17(c)).
47. Glancey 11, 542 A.2d at 1355.
48. Id. In Cunningham, the court considered this argument and rejected it, stating:
The fact that the Board was concerned primarily with 17(b) and the provisions of the
Code promulgated thereunder does not preclude this Court from making a finding of
a violation under 17(c), if the record warrants such a finding. No rights of the respondents are offended by this Court assessing the conduct presented in this record in
light of the prohibition set forth in 17(c), while reviewing the specific charges found
to have been sustained by the Board.
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Glancey next contended that the Code of Judicial Conduct did
not preclude the acceptance of a Christmas gift. "9 Once again, however, the court stated that its decision in Cunningham had already
resolved this issue, and further discussion was unnecessary."
Lastly, Glancey argued that he should not be subject to sanction
for providing an untruthful exculpatory response to an inquiry by
the FBI."1 He stated that the federal statute52 prohibiting false or
fraudulent statements to federal agents did not apply here since he
provided nothing more than an exculpatory negative response. 3
Justice Nix dismissed this argument, stating that "such a response
given by a judge of the court system in this Commonwealth warrants discipline.

'5 4

Moreover, the court rejected Glancey's conten-

tion that since he is also a citizen, he should not be deprived of his
"right" to provide an exculpatory response to federal questioning.5
The court reasoned that "requiring a judge to respond honestly to
an official inquiry would [not] be unduly burdensome on the judicial official, nor do we believe that it creates a Hobson's choice
which effectively abridges that official's rights under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." 56 Since nothing in
the opinion could be read as having deprived Glancey of his fifth
amendment privilege, the court found that Glancey's conduct violated the public trust bestowed upon him.57 Therefore, the supreme court accepted the Board's recommendation of removal and
entered an order forever barring Glancey from seeking or holding
judicial office in Pennsylvania."
In the Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 429, 538 A.2d 473, 479 (1988).
49. Glancey 11, 542 A.2d at 1355.
50. Id. Here, the court also dismissed Glancey's challenge to the notice provided by
the canons. See also Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 434 n.17, 538 A.2d at 482 n.17.
51. Glancey 11, 542 A.2d at 1355.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1979). Section 1001 states: "Whoever ... knowingly and willfully falsifies . . . or makes a false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations
... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
Id.
53. Glancey 11, 542 A.2d at 1355. Apparently Glancey felt that since his simple denial
was not made under oath, it should not be punished if untruthful. This would protect the
unwitting citizen from possible extreme pressure of a federal investigation. Id. See United
States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1975).
54. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1355.
55. Id. Here, the court referred to the commentary to Canon 2, which states that a
judge must "[aiccept restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly." Id.
56. Glancey 11, 542 A.2d at 1356.
57. Id. See supra note 7 for the language of Canons 1 and 2.
58. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1356. The court refused to consider the issue of whether
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Justice Papadakos filed a concurring opinion in which he concluded that the final disposition of the case and the majority's
opinion constituted an express removal of Glancey from office. 5 '
With this end result, he joined the majority opinion. 0
In determining whether a Pennsylvania judge's acceptance of a
"gift" warrants the sanctions of suspension and removal or forfeiture of office, the supreme court has relied upon Article V, sections
1761 and 1862 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Canons of
Judicial Conduct s as a basis for its decision." Ever since the
Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted in 1776, judges have been
restricted from receiving fees or perquisites of any kind."5 While
the 1776 constitutional provision applied only to the judges of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it was amended in 1790 to include
the "presidents of the several courts of common pleas.""6 In 1874,
the constitution was further amended to prohibit all judges in
Pennsylvania from receiving any compensation, fees, or perquisites
for their services from any source.7
Glancey's eligibility for pension benefits should be denied because the question was not
properly presented before the court. Id. at 1356 n.11.
59. Id. at 1356-57. Justice Papadakos stated that no other conclusion could justify the
court's order forever barring Glancey from holding judicial office. Id.
60. Id.
61. See supra note 6 for the language of § 17(a), (b), and (c).
62. Article V, § 18 provides for the suspension, removal, discipline and compulsory
retirement of judicial officers upon recommendation of the Board and approved by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See infra notes 80-84, 86 for the language of §§ 18(d)-(h) and
§ 18(1).
63. The court specifically relied upon Canon 1, see supra note 7, Canan 2, see supra
note 7, and Canon 5C(1), see supra note 14.
64. Glancey II, 542 A.2d at 1353-56.
65. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 23, which provided that the judges of the supreme court
of judicature should not be allowed to sit as members in the Continental Congress and
should not hold any other office, civil or military, nor take or receive fees or perquisites of
any kind. Id. See also A History of Pennsylvania's Constitutions,The Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, Manual No. 3 (1967), which states that during the convention of 1776,
the radicals were suspicious of a strong executive and of a too-independent judiciary. The
judges were given limited tenure (seven years), and though appointed by the executive and
subject to removal by the legislature for "misbehavior," the courts were unlikely to serve as
a check on the few legislative controls. Id. at 2-3.
66. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. V, § 2. This section provided that the judges of the supreme court and the presidents of the several courts of common pleas should receive no fees
or perquisites of office nor hold any other office of profit under the Commonwealth. Id. See
also A History of Pennsylvania's Constitutions, The Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention, Manual No. 3 (1967), where it is stated that the main thrust of the 1789-90 convention
was to put a check on the legislature. Id. at 4. In response, the judiciary was overhauled; life
tenure on good behavior was substituted for limited tenure, and judges were subject to removal by impeachment. Id. at 5.
67. PA. CONST. of 1874, art. V, § 18. "The judges of the Supreme Court and the judges
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Pennsylvania's present amendment of 1968 added Article V, section 17,68 which prohibits judges and justices of the peace from violating any canon of legal or judicial ethics prescribed by the supreme court. 9 Section 17(c) provides that "[n]o justice, judge, or
justice of the peace shall be paid or accept for the performance of
any judicial duty or for any service connected with his office, any
fee, emolument or perquisite other than the salary and expenses
provided by law."' 70 The purpose of this section is to mandate a
7
high standard of impartiality to judges. '
In November 1973, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted
the Code of Judicial Conduct. 72 Canons 1, 2, and 5C(1) were
designed to support the standard of impartiality set forth in Article V, section 17(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution.73 Canon 1
states that judges must maintain "high standards of conduct so
that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. '74 Canon 2 additionally reinforces the objective of maintaining the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 75 Furthermore, Canon 2B states that judges should not "convey or
knowingly permit others to convey the impression that they are in
a special position to influence him."' 76 Canon 5C(1) clearly directs
that a jurist is to refrain from dealings that tend to adversely effect
his impartiality and involve him in frequent transactions with perof the several courts of common pleas, and all other judges required to be learned in the law,
•.. shall receive no other compensation, fees or perquisites of office for their service from
any source ... " Id. See also A History of Pennsylvania'sConstitutions, The Pennsylvania
Constitutional Convention, Manual No. 3 (1967), which declares that the overriding purposes of the 1874 convention were the elimination of legislative abuses and improprieties,
restraint on the power of corporations, especially the railroads, and cure of the sins of the
political "rings" (i.e., colonizing and ballot-stuffing). Id. at 13-18.
68. PA. CONST. art. V, § 17 (adopted April 23, 1968). The language of this constitutional provision is quoted supra note 6.
69. PA. CONST. art. V, § 17(b). See supra note 6.
70. PA. CONST. art. V, § 17(c). See supra note 6.
71. See In the Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473, 480-81 (1988).
72. The Code of Judicial Conduct, 455 Pa. xxix, 310 A.2d xxxix (1973). On November
21, 1973, effective January 1, 1974, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct (hereinafter "Code") in part. Id. at
xxix. The ABA Code has now been adopted in whole or in part by 47 states (excluding
Wisconsin, Rhode Island, and Montana), the District of Columbia, and the Federal Judicial
Conference. See Shaman, Two States Adopt ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 8 JUD.
CONDUCT REP. 1 (1987).
73. See Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 431, 538 A.2d at 480-81.
74. See supra note 7 for the language of Canon 1.
75. See supra note 7 for the language of Canon 2.
76. See supra note 7 for the language of Canon 2B.
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sons likely to appear before him in court."' Although no where are
gifts to judges expressly prohibited by these canons,7 receipt of
gifts which would adversely reflect upon the integrity of the judiciary would be prohibited.7 9
To implement the enforcement of section 17 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, which encompasses the canons, section 18 of Article
V creates a Judicial Inquiry and Review Board (hereinafter
"Board"),"0 and vests in that body the authority to receive complaints as to matters pertaining to grounds for suspension, removal
and discipline of judges, and to make investigations if necessary.8 1
77. See supra note 14 for the text of Canon 5C(1).
78. See Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 432 n.14, 538 A.2d at 481 n.14. Canon 32 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provided that: "A judge should not accept any presents or favors
from litigants, or from lawyers participating before him or from others whose interests are
likely to be submitted to him for judgment." The Canons of Judicial Ethics, 425 Pa. XXiii,
XXXV, effective February 11, 1965. The Canons of Judicial Ethics were superseded by the
Judicial Code, which does not contain a parallel provision. Cunningham,517 Pa. at 432, 538
A.2d at 481.
79. Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 433, 538 A.2d at 481. See In the Matter of Dandridge, 462
Pa. 67, 337 A.2d 885 (1975). The Board instituted formal proceedings against Paul A. Dandridge, Judge of the court of common pleas, charging that he had accepted for personal use
the proceeds of a dinner given in his honor. Id. at 69, 337 A.2d at 886. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that the charges were not required to be dismissed on the ground that
Dandridge was charged only with a violation of Canon 32, which was superseded by the
Code of Judicial Conduct, where it was also charged that Dandridge's acceptance of such
monies gave the appearance of impropriety, which was tantamount to a charge of violation
of Canon 4, such canons were in effect at the time the dinner was held, and the standard
which proscribed that conduct carried forward without interruption by the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Id. at 71-76, 337 A.2d at 887-89 (the old Canon 4 is embodied within the new
Canon 2). The court stated that "[i]gnorance of the Canons and misconduct by others are
no defense." Id. at 75, 337 A.2d at 889. The court also held that Dandridge was not "prosecuted" in a discriminatory manner because of an alleged practice among some Philadelphia
judges to retain testimonial dinner proceeds, where such practice had been condemned at
least since the adoption of the Canons of Judicial Ethics in 1965 and the record was barren
of any suggestion that Dandridge was singled out by the Board. Id. at 75, 337 A.2d at 889.
In conclusion, the court authorized the Board to admonish Dandridge concerning his conduct in accepting proceeds of the dinner for his own personal use, and ordered Dandridge to
pay over to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania the sum of the proceeds of said dinner
($23,500). Id.
80. See supra note 62 for the language of PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a), (b), (c). See also §
18(d) which states:
[Any justice or judge may be suspended, removed from office or otherwise disciplined for violation of section seventeen of this article, misconduct in office, neglect of
duty, failure to perform his duties, or conduct which prejudices the proper administration of justice or brings the judicial office into disrepute and may be retired for
disability seriously interfering with the performance of his duties.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d).
81. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(e). Section 18(e) provides that:
The board shall keep informed as to matters relating to grounds for suspension, removal, discipline, or compulsory retirement of justices or judges. It shall receive com-
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After such investigation, the Board may order a hearing, in which
case it may also request either testimony of witnesses or production of documents.8 2 "If, after hearing, the board finds good cause
therefor, it shall recommend to the supreme court the suspension,
removal, discipline or compulsory retirement of the justice or
judge.""' Upon such recommendation, the supreme court must review the record on the law and facts, and either order a sanction or
wholly reject the recommendation as it finds just and proper.8 The
language of this article clearly vests in the supreme court the responsibility of making its independent determination from the testimony presented, and of determining the appropriate sanction
that should be imposed. 5 Upon a sanction or removal from office
under this section, the judge must automatically forfeit his judicial
office and be forever barred from holding such office in the
future.86
In reaching its conclusion that Judge Glancey must be removed
from his judicial office, the supreme court relied heavily upon its
recent decision in In the Matter of Cunningham.8 7 In Cunningplaints or reports, formal or informal, from any source pertaining to such matters,
and shall make such preliminary investigations as it deems necessary.
Id.
82. Id. at § 18(f). This section provides: "The board, after such investigation, may
order a hearing concerning the suspension, removal, discipline or compulsory retirement of a
justice or judge. The board's orders for attendance of or testimony by witnesses or for the
production of documents at any hearing or investigation shall be enforceable by contempt
proceedings." Id.
83. Id. at § 18(g).
84. Id. at § 18(h). Section 18(h) provides in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall review the record of the board's proceedings on the law and
facts and may permit the introduction of additional evidence. It shall order suspension, removal, discipline or compulsory retirement, or wholly reject the recommendation, as it finds just and proper. Upon an order for compulsory retirement, the justice
or judge shall be retired with the same rights and privileges were he retired under
section sixteen of this article. Upon an order for suspension or removal, the justice or
judge shall be suspended or removed from office, and his salary shall cease from the
date or such order ....
Id.
85. See In the Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 424, 538 A.2d 473, 477 (1988); In
the Matter of Glancey, 515 Pa. 201, 527 A.2d 997, 1005 (1987); Judicial Inquiry and Review
Bd. v. Snyder, 514 Pa. 142, 523 A.2d 294 (1987).
86. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(1). "A justice, judge or justice of the peace convicted of
misbehavior in office by a court, disbarred as a member of the bar of the Supreme Court or
removed under this section eighteen shall forfeit automatically his judicial office and thereafter be ineligible for judicial office." Id.
87. 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473 (1988). In Cunningham, Chief Justice Nix, writing the
opinion for the court, was joined by Justices Flaherty and McDermott. Justices Zappala and
Papadakos filed concurring opinions, and Justice Larsen did not participate in the consideration or decision of the cases. Id. at 450-57, 538 A.2d at 490-93.
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ham, the Board filed recommendations with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that eight sitting Philadelphia County judgess be removed from office for their acceptance of cash gifts from the
Roofers' Union Local 30-30B ("Union"). 9 The Board determined
that the receipt of cash gifts constituted a violation of Canons 1, 2,
and 5C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and recommended that
all eight judges be removed from judicial office. 90 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that it was not bound by the recommendation of the Board, 91 but that sanctions of suspension and removal or forfeiture of office were warranted under Article V, section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution for the eight judges'
92
acceptance of cash gifts.

The Cunningham court reasoned that Article V, section 18(h)s
vests in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the responsibility of
making an independent determination from the testimony
presented and ordering the appropriate sanction that should be
imposed.94 Secondly, the court explored Article V, section 17(c),
which specifically prohibits a jurist from receiving any fees or perquisites in connection with the duties of his office, except the salary and expenses provided by law.98 The court determined that the
clear intent of this section is to "prohibit a jurist from permitting
88. Id. Seven of the eight judges charged served on the court of common pleas, and
the remaining judge, Judge Thomas E. Dempsey, served as a member of the municipal
court. The seven court of common pleas judges were: Judge Kenneth Harris; Judge Julian F.
King; Judge Mitchell Lipschutz; Judge Thomas White; Judge William J. Porter; Judge
Michael E. Wallace; and Judge Mary Rose Fante Cunningham. Id. at 439-46, 538 A.2d at
484-88.
89. Id. at 421-23, 538 A.2d at 475-76.
90. Id. at 423, 538 A.2d at 476. Six members of the Board recommended removal of all
eight judges, and three members recommended public censure and suspension with out pay
for a period not to exceed one year as the appropriate sanction for all judges except for
Judge Harris, in whose case the vote for removal was unanimous. Id. at 423 n.2, 538 A.2d at
476 n.2.
91. Id. at 424, 538 A.2d at 476-77.
92. Id. at 425-28, 538 A.2d at 477-79.
93. See supra note 84 for the language of Article V, § 18(h).
94. Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 424, 538 A.2d at 477. The sanctions that may be considered are suspension, removal, discipline or compulsory retirement. See Article V, § 18(h),
supra note 84. Both sanctions of suspension and removal require that the salary cease from
the date of entry of an order. Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 424, 538 A.2d at 477. Upon the entry
of an order requiring compulsory retirement, the jurist "shall be retired with the same rights
and privileges were he retired under section sixteen of this article." PA. CONST. art. V, §
18(h).
95. Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 428, 538 A.2d"at 479. In Cunningham, it was clear to the
court that the Union intended that the giving of the cash gifts was to secure favorable treatment for the Union or its members. Id.
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any person or entity from establishing a relationship, through the
transmittal of anything of value, to place that person or entity in a
favored position."" 6 Furthermore, the court stated that a violation
of section 17(c) would warrant a sanction of removal without the
necessity of establishing any specific violation under the Code of
Judicial Conduct.17 At this point, the court noted that the amount
or value of the gift is of no significance if it is given and received to
influence the jurist in the performance of his duties.9 8
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also focused its attention
on the Code of Judicial Conduct.9 9 Despite the fact that nowhere
in the Canons are gifts to judicial officials expressly prohibited,10 0
the court was satisfied that the Canons were designed to support
the standard of impartiality mandated under Article V, section
17(c). 10 1 However, the court rejected a per se prohibition against a
jurist receiving a gift, stating that there may be occasions where
such acceptance would be proper.10 2
In reaching its decision, the Cunningham court rejected several
arguments made by the judges. First, the court rejected any argument relying upon the vagueness of the Canons. 03 Secondly, subsequent to the supreme court's decision in In the Matter of Dandridge,0 there could be no question that Canon 5C(1) applies to
the acceptance of an improper gift by a jurist. 0 5 Even if the gift is
a "token or memorial," the judge is precluded from accepting it
under Canon 5C(1). 10 6 Next, the court rejected the idea that Canon
96. Id. The court further stated that if the jurist knew or should have known that the
gift was offered in order to gain favor with him, the acceptance of such gift would violate §
17(c), without regard to the code. Id.
97. Id. at 429, 538 A.2d at 479-80.
98. Id. The question is not the intrinsic value of the gift, but rather its impact upon
the jurist in his official duties. Id. Since the clear purpose of § 17 is to assure the objectivity
of the jurist, the amount or value of the gift is of no relevance. Id.
99. Id. The pertinent Canons considered were Canons 1, 2, and 5C(1). Id.
100. Id. at 433, 538 A.2d at 481. See supra note 78.
101. Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 431, 538 A.2d at 480.
102. Id. at 433, 538 A.2d at 481. The court stated that "[t]he interest to be protected
is the impartiality of the judicial process; the impropriety of accepting a gift arises only
when that interest is compromised." Id.
103. Id. at 432, 538 A.2d at 482. A competent jurist should have little difficulty in
understanding concepts such as "integrity," "independence" and "impartiality." Id.
104. 462 Pa. 67, 337 A.2d 888 (1975). See supra note 79 for a synopsis of Dandridge.
105. Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 435, 538 A.2d at 482. The judges had challenged the
applicability of Canon 5C(1), arguing that it was intended to refer only to "financial and
business dealings" in which a gift does not fall. Id.
106. Id. The court stated that the issue is not the value of the gift, but rather whether
it was improper to accept it. A jurist may not accept any gift if it may affect his impartiality
in matters before the court relating to the donor. Id.
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5C(1) was intended to apply only to ongoing dealings, and stated
that even a "single incident that undermines the integrity of judicial rulings causes irreparable harm. 1 1 Lastly, the supreme court
rejected the judges' allegations of a due process violation predicated on the alleged commingling of functions by the Board 0 8 and
the surveillance evidence which was allegedly illegally obtained
and hearsay.1 09 The court dismissed the commingling of function 110
and evidence 1 challenges and focused its attention on the facts
and arguments unique to each of the judges. 2 The supreme court
concluded that the judges' acceptance of cash gifts from the Union
in consideration of placing the Union in a favored position warranted the sanctions of suspension and removal or forfeiture of
office.113
In Judicial Inquiry and Review Board v. Snyder,1 14 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was faced with a factual scenario
parallel to the Glancey If case. Judge Snyder had been charged
with misconduct in connection with a trial over which he presided. 1 5 After an investigation into the matter, the Board con107. Id. at 435, 538 A.2d at 483.
108. Id. The judges argued that the procedures employed by the Board and its Executive Director constituted impermissible commingling of investigative, adjudicatory and
prosecutorial functions, in violation of due process clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Id.
109. Id. at 435-39, 538 A.2d at 483-84.
110. Id. The issue of commingling of Board functions was dismissed by the supreme
court in Glancey I, where the court stated that there was not improper admixture of functions and that the Board's recommendation is merely advisory at best and has no binding
effect. Id. at 436, 538 A.2d at 483 (citing In the Matter of Glancey, 515 Pa. 201, 217, 527
A.2d 997, 1005 (1987)).
111. Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 438, 538 A.2d at 484. The supreme court held that the
electronic surveillance evidence was not illegally secured and that the statements from the
surveillance tended circumstantially to show the state of mind of the speakers in offering
the gifts, and therefore, was admissible non-hearsay. Id.
112. Id. at 439-50, 538 A.2d at 484-490. Individual discussion of each judge is omitted.
113. Id. Six of the judges, Harris, King, Lipschutz, White, Wallace, and Cunningham,
were removed from office, and Judges Porter and Dempsey received a sanction of suspension
and forfeiture of office. Id.
114. 514 Pa. 142, 523 A.2d 294 (1987). The majority opinion in Snyder was written by
Justice Hutchinson, and joined by Justice Larsen and Justice Zappala. Id. at 144, 523 A.2d
at 295. Chief Justice Nix filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Flaherty joined. Id. at
153, 523 A.2d at 299. Justices McDermott and Papadakos filed concurring and dissenting
opinions. Id.
115. Id. at 144-45, 523 A.2d at 295. The Board found that Judge Bernard Snyder:
[Hield frequent ex parte conferences with counsel for the plaintiff without informing
defense counsel; that these discussions centered on evidentiary and other legal issues
involved in this bench trial; that respondent [Judge Snyder] permitted both counsel
to engage in unprofessional conduct during the trial...;that respondent entered an
exceptionally large award of damages for the plaintiff without an evidentiary hearing
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cluded that Judge Snyder had violated Article V, section 17(b) of
the Board recomthe Pennsylvania Constitution,'1 s and 1therefore,
7
mended Snyder's removal from office.

Prior to the supreme court's action on the pending charges,
Judge Snyder failed in his bid for retention and was subsequently
removed from office by the electorate."18 After reviewing the record, the Snyder court held that although the issue of whether Snyder should be removed from judicial office was rendered moot by
the failure of the electors to retain him, removal of Snyder was
warranted by the cumulative effect of his improper acts.' Consewas found ineligible to subsequently hold
quently, Judge Snyder
20
any judicial office.'

The court in Snyder reasoned that Article V, section 18(1) of the
Pennsylvania Constitution' is clear in its mandate that the sanction of removal carries with it a permanent bar against future judicial service.' 22 In Snyder's situation, the electors had already removed him from office, but only the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
could sanction Snyder for his conduct by finding him ineligible to
hold any judicial office in the future. 23 Based upon clear and convincing evidence of Snyder's dereliction, the court determined that
it had a duty to bar Snyder from forever holding a judicial office
again.

12 4

Despite various changes in the Pennsylvania Constitution and
the addition of the Code of Judicial Conduct, in place of the Caand based those damages on information obtained outside the record and that respondent presided at a hearing on a motion for his own recusal, acting simultaneously
as judge and as a witness.
Id. (footnote omitted).
116. Id. The Board found that Judge Snyder, by violating Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the
Code, had violated Article V, § 17(b). Id.
117. Id. at 144, 523 A.2d at 295.
118. Id. at 151, 523 A.2d at 298. The denial of Judge Snyder's quest for retention as a
common pleas judge rendered moot the question of whether the court should remove Snyder
from judicial office. Id. See Curry v. Parkhouse, 468 Pa. 542, 364 A.2d 326 (1976); Meyer v.
Strouse, 422 Pa. 136, 221 A.2d 191 (1966).
119. Snyder, 514 Pa. at 151-53, 523 A.2d at 298-99.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 86 for the language of Article V, § 18(1).
122. Snyder, 514 Pa. at 153, 523 A.2d at 299.
123. Id. Article V, § 18(h) directs the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to review the
record of the Board's proceeding and assume the responsibility for disciplining justices and
judges. See supra note 84 for the language of Article V, § 18(h).
124. Id. The court reached its decision after reviewing all the Board's findings and
Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the code, along with Article V, § 18(h)(1) of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 144-53, 523 A.2d at 295-99.
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nons of Judicial Ethics, Pennsylvania courts have consistently
ruled that the receipt of fees or gifts in return for judicial favors, or
other judicial acts of impartiality, warrants the sanctions of removal from office or suspension and forfeiture of office."2 5 This
consistency in court rulings results form the indispensable need to
maintain the impartiality, integrity and independence of the judicial system. The Pennsylvania Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct confer upon each jurist the responsibility of not only
avoiding any impropriety, but also of avoiding the appearance of
any impropriety. 2 6 Where a judicial officer breaches the trust
vested in him, the injury is further compounded because a public
trust has been betrayed. 27 Therefore, when a jurist is offered a gift
or present from a litigant or other person who may appear before
him, the judge must protect against the appearance of impropriety.
Gifts should never be accepted "unless a relationship exists, and
the circumstances are such that a conclusion of wrongdoing cannot
be drawn.' 2 8 "The jurist must be held accountable, even though
125. See Snyder, 514 Pa. at 142, 523 A.2d 294; In the Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa.
417, 538 A.2d 473 (1988); In the Matter of Glancey, 542 A.2d 1350 (1988); In the Matter of
Dandridge, 462 Pa. 67, 337 A.2d 885 (1975); and Keiser v. Bell, 322 F. Supp. 608 (D.C. Pa.
1971)(Magistrate Keiser permanently removed from judicial office by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for his receipt of payment to influence the outcome of cases pending in state
court). See also 48A C.J.S. Judges §§ 29, 40, 41 (1979), for general considerations of forfeiture, discipline, suspension, or removal of judges from judicial office.
126. Commentary, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that:
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by
judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. He must
expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. He must therefore accept restrictions on his conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly....
The Code of Judicial Conduct, 455 Pa. xxx-xxxi (1973).
127. See, e.g., In re Franciscus, 471 Pa. 53, 369 A.2d 1190, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870
(1977). In Franciscus, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that:
A judge or justice of the peace in fulfilling his judicial function must not only strive to
insure fair treatment toward every individual who appears before him, but he must
also present the appearance of fairness and probity in his behavior as a judicial officer. If that appearance falters, the confidence of the public will naturally wane.
Id. at 62, 369 A.2d at 1195.
In the footnote to the above quote, the court referred to Clark, Judicial Self-Regulation Its Potential,35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (1970) and Miller, Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections, 35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1970). The court stated:
That some judges-however few in number is beside the point, for even one rotten
judicial apple can go far toward spoiling the entire judicial barrel fall short of the
requisite standards of integrity and propriety (nebulous and ill defined though they
may be) creates a large part of the problem of public confidence.
Franciscus,417 Pa. at 62 n.9, 369 A.2d at 1195 n.9.
128. Matter of Dalessandro, 483 Pa. 431, 397 A.2d 743 (1979). The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has rejected the implication that the matters in ones' personal life which legit-
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he or she may not harbor an intent to show favor to the donor, in
those circumstances which would legitimately give rise to a contrary conclusion."1 2' 9
Pennsylvania courts have also stated that the fact that a gift or
fee may appear de minimis is of no significance if the contribution
was given and received to influence the jurist in the performance of
his judicial responsibilities. 13 0 Whatever the value of the gift, once
given and accepted as a means to secure judicial favor, the impartiality and integrity of the entire court system is eroded. 31
But observe that in Cunningham, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court stated that there may be situations in which a gift from a
friend could be legitimate if the donee is able to establish:
(1) that the gift was given only in connection with that relationship and (2)
that the donee is satisfied that the circumstances surrounding the acceptance of the gift would not create a reasonable basis for the donor to believe
that the gift places the donor in a position to exert improper influence over
the donee in the discharge of his legal duties."'

An example of such a situation is the recent case of In the Matter
of Braig.'3 3 In Braig, the Board instituted formal proceedings
against Judge Braig, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, for alleged violations of Canons 1, 2 and
5C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Board alleged that
Braig accepted a cash gift from Stephen Traitz, Jr., the business
manager of the Roofer's Union, Local 30-30B (Union) in the year
1985.1"' After a hearing on the matter, the entire Board recomimately reflect upon the jurists' professional integrity are immune from censure. Id. The
opinion in that appeal was joined by only two members of the court, and therefore, does not
represent a binding precedent. See Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 430-31 n.12, 538 A.2d at 480
n.12. "However, the test of the appearance of impropriety is not to be given an overly
scrupulous gloss. The overly suspicious mind often assigns guilt where none exists." Id.
129. Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 430-31, 538 A.2d at 480. See also In the Matter of Dandridge, 462 Pa. 67, 337 A.2d 885 (1975).
130. Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 430, 538 A.2d at 480.
131. Id. "The question is not the intrinsic value of the thing offered but rather its
impact upon the actions of the jurist." Id.
132. Id. at 452, 538 A.2d at 491 (Zappala, J., concurring).
133. In the Matter of Braig, No. 128, slip op. (Pa. Oct. 25, 1988). Justice Stout wrote
the majority opinion in the case. Mr. Justice Zappala filed a concurring opinion and Justice

Papadakos filed a dissenting opinion. Justices Larsen and McDermott did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case. Id. at 17.
134. Braig, No. 128, slip op. at 2. On January 29, 1987, the Board amended the charges
to allege a violation of Canon 7 of the Code for attempting to influence the selection of the
new Police Commissioner. The relevant section of Canon 7 is 7A(4), which provides:
Canon 7. A Judge Should Refrain From Political Activity Inappropriate to His Judicial Office
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mended the removal of Judge Braig from his judicial office. 3 ' The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the $350 was a Christmas gift from Traitz, the friend, and not from Traitz, the roofer,
and dismissed the charges against Braig.' s 6 The court reasoned
that:
[The] physical act of passing money is an act of ambiguity. It may be the
receipt of a loan, the repayment of a loan, a bribe, a gift, or any one of a
myriad [of] other transactions. The ambiguity of that act may be cleared by
the verbal part of it if such exists. In this case, the verbal part of the act
indicates clearly that the passing of the envelopes was the passing of a
7

1
gift. 3

Justice Papadakos, in his dissenting opinion, agreed that the record was deficient of clear and convincing evidence to establish that
Braig acted improperly in accepting gifts from a known corrupting
source, but he would have remanded the matter to the Board for
further investigation to determine the source of the funds used by
Traitz "to shower gifts upon Judge Braig over the years. "138 Justice
A. Political Conduct in General
(4) A judge should not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7 (1973).
135. Braig, No. 128, slip op. at 3. The Board concluded that Braig violated Canon 1 in
that he failed to disclose the $500 cash gift on the Statement of Financial Interest (he had
disclosed on his Statement the acceptance of a $350 cash gift from Mr. and Mrs. Traitz),
that Braig violated Canon 2 in that he conveyed to Traitz the impression that Traitz was in
a special position to influence him, that Braig violated Canon 5 in that his conduct constituted a financial dealing that tended to reflect adversely on his impartiality, and that Braig
violated Canon 7 by engaging in political activity when he attempted to influence the selection of the Police Commissioner. Id.
136. Id. at 8. The court stated that it was clear from the circumstances that there
existed an intergenerational friendship between the families, a current close association between the families (i.e., prior exchanges of gifts, visits, each family's attendance at ceremonial occasions of the other's family), and an interest in each other's children. Id. "Whatever
the amount Braig received, it was exactly as he typified, a gift from a friend which in no way
demeaned his integrity or independence as a jurist or the public confidence in the integrity
of the judiciary. There was no clear and convincing proof to the contrary." Id. at 10.
137. Id. at 8-9 (footnote omitted). But note that in that same Christmas season (1985),
Traitz was sending cash-filled envelopes to other Philadelphia judges. See Cunningham, 517
Pa. at 417, 538 A.2d 473. In late 1986, Traitz was convicted for bribery and racketeering for
using money obtained through kickbacks to make cash payments to public officers, including members of the Philadelphia judiciary, and is currently serving a fifteen-year prison
term. See Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 421, 538 A.2d at 475; In the Matter of Glancey, 542 A.2d
1350, 1351 (1988); Braig, No. 128, slip op. at 1-2.
138. Braig, No. 128, slip op. at 1-2 (Papadakos, J., dissenting). Justice Papadakos observed that Braig should have known the situation he was getting into with Traitz and
avoided it. He continued by stating: "As the saying goes, with friends like that, who needs
enemies?" Id. at 2.
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Papadakos reasoned that "exoneration of Judge Braig at this time,
without further investigation, will be misperceived by the public
and lessen confidence in the integrity of our judiciary and its ability to police one another." 13 9
Despite the novel decision in Braig, the jurist exposes himself to
a charge of impropriety in accepting gifts or perquisites of any
value from anyone directly or indirectly affected by the Pennsylvania court system. This demanding standard placed upon the commonwealth's judicial officers can be justified by the need to maintain the public trust and confidence, as well as to preserve an
impartial and independent judicial system. These important interests far outweigh the possible burdens which may be imposed upon
the state's judicial officers in declining gifts and favors.
Barbara Moyer

139. Id. at 1. Justice Papadakos felt concerned that the public confidence in the judiciary may be lessened, especially in light of the fact that Braig currently faces federal criminal charges arising out of circumstances closely paralleling the charges considered in this
case. Id. He concluded by stating that "[p]erhaps we must stay content with the realization
that Judge Braig will remain off the bench under order of this Court while the federal
charges are pending." Id. at 2.

